U.S. Army Remote Viewing Surveillance

Operational Remote Viewing

I remain bound by my original secrecy oath and cannot disclose much about operational missions. Because of security restrictions, I am unable to provide the names of the various agencies that requested remote-viewing information or the nature of the requests themselves. But the official logbook of all the operational missions conducted while I was with the Fort Meade remote-viewing unit, I conducted 122 operational missions consisting of many hundreds of separate remote-viewing sessions with a number of individual remote viewers.

SRI used a standard of blind differential discrimination to judge remote-viewing efforts. We at Fort Meade simply asked the tasking agencies to tell us if the information provided was of intelligence value. But by the nature of intelligence work, this sometimes involved difficulties. Many times, remote viewers provided accurate descriptions of areas of interest, but those descriptions were not necessarily of value.

For example, if a tasking agency wanted to determine if a certain type of aircraft was located at a designated airfield, we would cue the remote viewer with the geographic coordinates of that airfield. Since the viewer had no overt idea that she was targeted against an airfield, a remote viewing session that described an airfield provided some evidence that the viewer had connected with the target area. But if the session provided no information that could confirm or refute the presence of the suspected aircraft, the session would be rated by the tasking agency as having no intelligence value, the viewer not having connected with the information of interest.

Let’s look a little more closely at the issue. Imagine that you’re given a camera and a roll of film and told to take pictures of a certain building. You go out to the neighborhood, taking a few snapshots along the way. You find the address, and you begin to photograph the building. The person who told you to take the pictures actually wants to know if there is a red car parked in front of the building but didn’t want you to know this. Not knowing the client’s special interest, you take some nice pictures of the building from as many angles as you think appropriate. After you’re through, you take some more pictures of the neighborhood, including the cars in front of the building.

Now, when you take the pictures back, your client thumbs through them rapidly, tossing most of them aside. Some are good pictures of the building but of no intelligence value. Some are not of the building at all. A few pictures, however, clearly show the red car parked in front of the building and, as luck would have it, one of your extra pictures is of the car itself.

In the same manner, certain remote-viewing missions provided information of intelligence value. Some were quite spectacular, and special military commendations were awarded to the remote viewers. Others were great examples of remote viewing but provided little or no information of direct intelligence value. Still other sessions were complete misses, demonstrating that remote viewing is, among other things, constrained by individual differences. Even the best baseball sluggers only get a hit about thirty percent of the time they are at bat. That’s what batting 300 means.

This idea of intelligence value went to the core of our OPSEC evaluation of the remote-viewing surveillance technique. In fact, we had been initially chartered by INSCOM to determine if hostile exploitation of remote-viewing surveillance was a threat to national security. According to the official logbook, during my tour of duty as the operations and training officer, forty-seven percent of the operational projects I conducted were rated by the tasking agency as being of intelligence value. (Again, due to continued security restrictions, I cannot describe the detailed results of specific operations.)

Those of you who find themselves on this website page are probably interested in learning about some of the remote-viewing surveillance operations. The FOIA or Freedom of Information Act has made it possible for the public to review a limited amount of STAR GATE information. Since I was part of STAR GATE, I have little interest in reviewing these highly redacted documents. Others, however, have used them a source material for books and speculation about the undisclosed STAR GATE activities.

Since for me this all started with an OPSEC emphasis I would like to share one author's reporting of an OPSEC oriented remote-viewing tasking regarding the XM1 battle tank. When the tank was under development, their emerged a question about how much hostile intelligence knew about the prototype tank under development. If hostiles knew of the new tanks capabilities they could develop countermeasures even before the tank showed up on the battlefield. The standard army OPSEC counterintelligence measure were fully employed and the Fort Meade remote-viewing unit was asked to join the effort.

Paul Smith's book Reading the Enemy's Mind: Inside Star Gate: America's Psychic Espionage Program provides a well written account of the XM1 battle tank OPSEC mission. As it turned out, we moved away from the OPSEC orientation fairly quickly. How do you protect sensitive military information from remote viewers working for a hostile intelligence service? By 1986 the Fort Meade unit had outgrown the army's intelligence command and its army OPSEC, accepting a wide variety of intelligence collection requirements from agencies outside the army. For bureaucratic and funding reasons the Fort Meade unit was transferred to the auspices of the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency).

This move to DIA was essentially the end of our OPSEC effort. The unit then focused on the intelligence collection requirements of several customers: government agencies. Again, due to continued security restrictions, I cannot describe the detailed results of specific operations. But I don't have an interest in the information from these sessions. What is more of value to me is recognition of the viewers, the mind-expanding experiences they had and the reflected deeper meaning that has for humankind. I guess I feel this way because I all ready know about the operational results of remote-viewing sessions.

But for those of you who still want to know more, FOIA is there for you. From Paul Smith's website, here's some great news for you:

After years of promises, the Central Intelligence Agency has at long last released the bulk of the so-called "Star Gate Archive" to the general public. At 89,901 pages, making up some 11,985 documents, the Archive is a monumental record of the US government's foray into remote viewing under code-names such as GRILL FLAME, CENTER LANE, SUN STREAK, and others, with the most widely known being STAR GATE. Tamra Temple has created an Interactive Archive of all this data from the CIA. It is now possible to navigate this vast amount of information because Tamra's Archive provides a user interactive index of the contents. You will spend hours mulling. Remember, many of the documents released under the FOIA will be extensively redacted.

Daz Smith has a very deep website filled with information about remote viewing. One section is dedicated to STAR GATE. If you find yourself browsing Daz Smith's website, you may be lost there for days. Daz is nothing less that dedicated to providing information about remote viewing.

Special Considerations

The use of remote viewing as an intelligence surveillance tool carries with it some special considerations. In working with human sources over the years, the intelligence community had established a rating system to attest to the bona fides of an individual human source and the authenticity of the information provided.

But the human-source rating system long used by the intelligence community is of little value when dealing with remote viewers. Throughout history, all of the serious scientific inquiry into remote viewing has demonstrated its veracity. These same investigations have, however, repeatedly indicated that the human behavioral mechanism behind remote viewing is neither understood nor reliable and, therefore, that the information reported by a remote viewer is characteristically undependable.

The information stream objectified by a remote viewer can be erroneous or valid or a mixture of both. The remote viewers themselves are of little help in determining which. From the perspective of a behavioral model, remote viewing would seem to have two principal dimensions. First, can the remote viewer acquire the target, and second, how well can the remote viewer become aware of the target and describe information of interest about the target? Ken Kress of the CIA developed an operational protocol with two characterization methods to deal with these dimensions.

Before the remote-viewing session, Ken would select a few obvious features, which, if described by the remote viewer, would show that he or she had at least some contact with the designated site. For example, if the intelligence mission was to describe the construction of a new ballistic missile and the remote viewer began by objectifying factory buildings and smokestacks known to be at the site, there was some level of confidence that the remote viewer was able to establish contact.

During the session, a quality characterization was accomplished by periodically asking the remote viewer to describe specific known features of the site. The accuracy of these audit descriptions would be used to estimate the quality of the unverifiable elements of the remote-viewing session. Through application of this operational protocol, remote-viewing data became intelligence information.

Sometime later, SRI became sensitive to the operational reliability issue and developed a simple, straightforward calibration system. Their view was that remote viewers were either on or off and that they had good days and bad days like anyone else. Athletes, musicians, artists, computer-code programmers, etc., all have days when they are high performers and days when they just can't seem to be able to function up to expectations. To provide the intelligence customer with some level of confidence about the remote-viewing information, viewers were given a randomly selected training target both before and after the operational target. If they did well with both the feedback verifiable training targets, the assumption was that the information provided about the operational target had a higher probability of being accurate to some degree. This calibration system was also helpful in building a sense of surety for the remote viewer. If the viewers did well on the training targets, they could, in effect, walk away from the operational mission with a sense of contributing even if they could not be given feedback on the operational site.

I always felt that remote viewing was modulated by many of the same factors that affect other human abilities. An individual’s expertise, based on previous practice, contributes to the ability to remote view. Psychological and sociological factors as well as meteorological and solar/geophysical conditions all affect the performance of remote viewers. Simply stated, one’s focus of attention, a headache, lack of sleep, mood, personality traits, motivation, expectation, state of consciousness, etc., all affect the ability to remote view. With so many variables at work, it would be inappropriate to depend only on a single factor such as mood or even previous experience to estimate the reliability of a remote viewer’s information when reporting to a consumer.

Remote viewing is multifaceted, interactive, nonlinear, and dynamic. A complex systems approach is the only way to understand remote-viewing performance. By observing a number of conditions (psychological, physical, physiological, and environmental data) during training sessions and then matching these up with successful performance, I was eventually able to establish profiles which could be used to rate the dependability of remote-viewing sessions. An excellent article by Dean I. Radin, Ph.D., Towards a Complex Systems Model of PSI Performance, describes the use of 149 relevant variables divided into eight categories—mood, personality, beliefs, meteorology, solar/geophysical, abnormal behavior, PSI performance, and composite factors—used in an artificial neural network to successfully predict PSI performance. I also found that we could increase the probability that we could respond to intelligence requirements with information of value by using multiple remote viewers. Knowing that the best remote viewers don’t always provide accurate information, I developed operational scenarios employing several remote viewers against the same requirements.

Working as a team, we were able to produce results more frequently than if we had used just one remote viewer. If a baseball team had to depend on just one player to get all the runs in a game, it would be hard-pressed, especially since the best sluggers (batting 300) only get a hit thirty percent of the time. Working as a team, however, it has a much better chance of getting a number of scoring runs and winning the game.

Moving On With Life

I retired from military service in February of 1988 and moved to Virginia. In Virginia I joined the staff of The Monroe Institute and began deepening my adventure into consciousness. My personal experience with military remote-viewing surveillance had objectively demonstrated the validity of a process I had been experiencing throughout my life. There was a greater cultural impact too. Through STAR GATE, two presidents, members of the National Security Council, CIA, FBI, etc., and numerous military and civilian government personnel discovered that what we know and experience is not bound by the confines of our physical perceptions. Our very being extends beyond the physical body in a very real way. The impact of this realization continues to grow as more and more people are uncovering the details of the government-sponsored work in remote viewing.

Looking Back

My experiences with remote viewing have become past-life experiences, a part of life rapidly becoming remember-when stories imprinted in the retreating memories of my mind.

Is remote viewing real? Those who research the field may come to convince themselves of its veracity based on decades of accumulating scientific evidence of the psychic phenomena. Psychologically, however, these well-meaning truth seekers remain protected by a defense mechanism. They can always escape back into their old belief systems under the guise that all the research is bogus and that it couldn’t possibly be true.

I, however, do not have the luxury of this psychological safe haven. I was the operations officer for the STAR GATE remote-viewing unit. I controlled the protocols and information overtly available to the remote viewers. I know, because I was there, that there was no fraud. Remote viewing is real. It works.

To me, the value of remote viewing lies not in so-called practical applications like performing services for business, industry, government, and science; or aiding in the recovery of lost children, assisting the FBI on kidnap cases, or helping to fight terrorism; or even contacting UFOs or spiritual beings. The value of remote viewing rests with the experience itself. The YouTube video below attribution goes to: Path 11 Productions, April Hannah and Michael Habernig.

Remote viewing is like stopping to smell the flowers, drinking a goblet of fine vintage wine, or making love. Through experience, we become who we are. Through remote viewing, we realize—make real—the true nature of ourselves as sentient beings.